Uganda. Within this district, a group of former child soldiers fell beyond the scope of almost all reintegration initiatives from the time a peace agreement was signed in 2002. Ten years after the youths' return from the bush, the authors used a qualitative approach to understand their present situation. It was found that serious grievances were still expressed by the former child soldiers towards organisations that had promised them some form of support, but did not ful¢l these promises. The e¡ect of these promises being broken and renewed, repeatedly, over an extended period of time has provoked a sense of helplessness and anger. The authors show how this group of youth try to navigate these emotions within their daily lives. The ¢ndings also point to the importance of taking historical, cultural and political contexts into account in order to fully understand the e¡ects of post con£ict experiences of 'former child soldiers' .
Introduction
Over the past three decades, children and youth a¡ected by war have received a lot of attention from humanitarian agencies and researchers, with the aim of addressing their mental health needs. Next to focussing on immediate support, this attention usually related to the fear that, should their perceived trauma's remain unaddressed, these generations might perpetuate cycles of violence in the future (Blattman & Annan, 2008; Summer¢eld, 1999) . Over the past decade, researchers have increasingly aimed to empirically assess the longer term impact of having been a child soldier Betancourt et al., 2010a,b. Many of these studies con¢rm that young people are resilient and report no return to violent behaviour in the long term aftermath of con£ict. In other words, longitudinal studies have shown that earlier concerns about so-called 'lost generations' are unwarranted (Blattman & Annan, 2008; Munive, 2010) . On the other hand, researchers do report speci¢c forms of psychological distress that remain prevalent, despite the passage of time, such as recurring thoughts of traumatic events, developing distrust as a coping strategy or transferring trauma through parenting practices Song & De Jong, 2013; Song et al., 2014, respectively) . Post con£ict experiences, such as stigmatisation of demobilised child soldiers, in addition to war exposure, are shown to in£uence the long term mental health outcomes of children's participation in armed con£ict (Betancourt et al., 2010a, b) . More and more attention is now being paid to the fact that post con£ict settings bring highly challenging sources of adversity of their own, e.g. increased domestic violence, unemployment, di⁄cult access to food or other resources, poverty, etc. (Miller & Rasmussen, 2010) . What happens after Unfulfilled promises, unsettled youth: the aftermath of conflict for former child soldiers in Yumbe District, north western Uganda, Intervention 2014, Volume 12, Number 3, Page 344 -355 war seems, therefore, to be equally as important as events during the con£ict in terms of understanding mental health outcomes. With this article, the authors contribute to this ¢eld of study of the long term impact of having been a child soldier through focussing on the experiences of a groups of former child soldiers (FCSs) in Yumbe District,10 years after disarmament. The article argues that an inductive (reasoned) approach is needed to come to locally relevant perspectives of what is at stake . Therefore, pre identi¢ed sets of questions were not used to seek understanding (cf. Bayer et al., 2007) , but rather ethnographic methods that pay attention to the lived experiences of FCSs in the aftermath of con£ict. Such an approach aligns with research that aims to take into account the social context when trying to make sense of the challenges faced by children a¡ected by war (cf. Derluyn et al.,2013) . By broadening the scope of investigation, beyond individual psychopathology or the psychosocial ¢eld, more complex realities emerge. They touch, amongst others, on political and economic realms, ¢elds that are much harder for the humanitarian community to address (Branch, 2011; Summer¢eld, 1999) .
Context
Background: rebel groups and abduction The Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II) was formed in 1996 (Alio, 1996) out of another rebel group active in the West Nile region; the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF). The WNBF were o⁄cially defeated in 1997, in South Sudan, where they had been based. Both rebel groups were formed by Idi Amin's former army personnel who had not been successfully reintegrated into the army after Museveni came to power in Uganda (Refugee Law Project (RLP), 2004) . The WNBF held a strong grip on the region in the mid 1990s, and were responsible for atrocities, abductions 1 and a heightened sense of general fear. Some of this study's informants had been abducted under WNBF, but later moved with the split to the UNRF II and their new base. The UNRF II was largely made up of Aringa o⁄cers and recruits from Aringa county in what is currently Yumbe District. The general position of former UNRF II combatants is that they were supported by the local population in Yumbe, did not prey on them and could draw on their voluntary support (RLP, 2004, pp 16^17) . This o⁄cial discourse has obscured UNRF II's involvement in atrocities in Yumbe itself, and silence on this topic prevails among survivors of atrocities in the region (Bogner & Neubert, 2013 , ¢eld notes JB). Our sample shows that 50% of our informants were abducted, whereas others joined for a variety of reasons, including; either their parents had been killed or were repeatedly tortured by either the UNRF II or the Ugandan Peoples Defence Force (UPDF) at home for information or suspected collaboration with the enemy. The latter informants report great tension at home and stated that it was better to join one of the camps in order to be able to protect oneself and ideally one's family. Others joined because they were upset about not receiving support from their parents to continue education, whereas the rebels promised them an income.
With the rebels Informants referred to the fact that while they felt they were not treated badly in the rebel camps in South Sudan, running away was impossible: 'we had no problems with the leaders but if you want to escape they kill you. Many times I witnessed it. ' Our informants also con¢rmed that the UNRF II fought next to the Sudanese army in South Sudan against the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in the late 1990s and often reported that younger children were not forced to engage in battles, but some chose Agreement, 2002) . This raised the expectation that their return to school would now be possible. In reality, it took the government of Uganda ¢ve years (2007 3 ), to communicate to the FCSs that they could register in schools and their school fees would be paid. However, as they enrolled in Secondary Schools in Yumbe, they had to withdraw before sitting for their exams as their school fees appeared not to have been paid. The FCSs suspect mismanagement of the funds meant for their education.
Amnesty cards
Adding to the stress caused by the failure to access education, the FCSs also never received an amnesty card. These were distributed in the rebel camp (under the Uganda Amnesty Act of 2000, cf. Finnegan & Flew, 2008) after the FCSs had been removed by UNICEF. Along with these cards, came an amnesty package of 263,000
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Ugandan Shillings and various items to facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants at home. In February 2010, the FCSs voiced their concerns in a letter to the Amnesty Commission 4 about not having received their amnesty cards. In May 2010, they were visited by the Amnesty Commission and had their photos taken. However, by February 2014 (almost four years later), the cards had still not been processed, nor have the FCSs received any form of amnesty package. In the interviews, our informants expressed serious concerns that various actors had tried to intervene in the registration process by the Amnesty Commission in 2010, later erasing the FCSs' names and photos and inserting their own relatives on the list to bene¢t from the amnesty packages. Whether true or not, the prevailing uncertainty about their access to these cards and lack of proper communication between the various actors involved (Amnesty Commission, former rebel leaders and FCSs) has given rise to further suspicion of corruption and rumours. Accessing the amnesty card is very important to the FCSs. This is not, in general, due to exemption from legal prosecution for acts committed under the UNRF II that the card a¡ords, something only two informants expressed reference to, 5 but the belief that without it, they will never access the 4,2 billion Ugandan Shillings the government promised for the resettlement of all ex-combatants (Article III, point 3, Peace Agreement, 2002). The focus of the FCSs on this money is clearly in line with what has been referred to as an ' environment of rewards' that exists in Yumbe, and in Uganda at large, where ex-combatants are often co-opted by promise of compensation. In the case of Yumbe this allowed the former rebels to preserve a heroic (instead of perpetrator) image of themselves (cf. Mischnick, 2009; RLP, 2004; Bogner & Neubert, 2013) .
In reality, this money has been distributed long ago, with payments beginning in 2004 (RLP, 2004 by former rebel leaders to their cliente' le. In fact, many adult UNRF II ex-combatants also claim never to have received their share. Yet, in the eyes of the FCSs, receiving an amnesty card will acknowledge their right to a share of this sum, and a possible belated payment. 6
Methodology
Project background Data for this article was gathered in Yumbe District, by the ¢rst author, during13 months of ethnographic ¢eldwork between 2010 and 2013. The data gathering formed part of a larger research project that focussed on youths from Yumbe District in the aftermath of a period of recurring violent con£ict, occurring from 1979 to 2002. Aware of the disproportional attention to child soldiers in Africa, in comparison to youth who had not been former child soldiers, the research did not speci¢cally target FCSs. However, the ¢rst author encountered this group in one of the ¢rst exploratory focus group discussions (FGD) held in 2010, in which a group of UNRF II former child soldiers, supported by their non former soldier peers, emphasised strong grievances related to their experiences in the aftermath of the peace agreement signed in 2002. These grievances kept re-emerging in interactions and conversations with FCSs, to such an extent that the authors decided to orient a part of their research speci¢cally to this group.
Research design and data collection
From the o⁄cial peace agreement document (2002), it was known that there were 135 UNRF II FCSs at that time, in the district, but by 10 years later they were quite dispersed. Some FCSs had joined the Ugandan army (UPDF) and many others had left for Kampala or other towns in Uganda and South Sudan to look for work. A total of 26 UNRF II FCSs from the original Both and Reis 135 were reached through snowball sampling, starting with key informants in di¡erent sub-counties including Yumbe Town Council and Arua Town. With these 26 FCSs, semi-structured interviews were undertaken, after obtaining oral informed consent and assuring con¢dentiality. 7 The researcher's contact with a local social worker, and other local structures, allowed for referral of research participants in need of psychosocial support. The interview guide was based on exploratory interviews and participant observation with four FCS and addressed: (1) circumstances under which the youth came to join the UNRF II rebel group; (2) levels of education obtained (before joining and after coming home); (3) reintegration experiences (e.g. family and community reception); (4) livelihoods; (5) current challenges; and (6) overall re£ections of the peace agreement of 2002. Twenty-one informants were interviewed only once, with ¢ve other key informant relationships developed further. These informants were extensively followed over the course of the ¢eldwork, between 2010 and 2013. In this period, time was spent regularly at their homes with their families, conducting informal conversations and engaging in participant observation. This, in turn, led to an in-depth understanding of their lived experiences. The method was aimed at triangulating inferences about the extent the reported grievances and hardship informed their daily experiences, and in which domains of their daily lives these played a part.
Participant pro¢le
The group of 26 FCSs formed a mixed group, of whom half (50%) reported to have been abducted, and 50% reported to have joined the rebels for other reasons, mentioned in the context section above. They spent di¡erent periods of time in the bush, varying from nine months to ¢ve years. The youngest ones reported having joined the rebels at age 11, while the oldest reported to have been age 17. During the time of the interviews, 19 informants lived in their respective home communities, while seven had moved into urban areas. The largest group was married, or had been married (n ¼ 21). These 21 informants had, on average, 2.6 children in 2011. Four informants reported no source of income, the largest group (n ¼14) reported that farming provided their main source of (meagre) income, and the remaining youth (n ¼ 8) held minimal jobs (such as barber or riding a bicycle-taxi) and reported erratic income.
Analysis
All data (from both the interviews and cases studies) were transcribed, anonymised and analysed through a process of open coding. In the process of data collection, a constant comparative approach (cf. Barnes, 1996) was used, allowing important concepts to emerge from the data and then selecting appropriate research methods (e.g. in-depth case studies) to further investigate these concepts. This process led to the emergence of the most important themes, which are presented as ¢ndings below.
Findings and analysis
A cycle of raising and shattering hope: helplessness and anger From the handing over of the UNRF II child soldiers to UNICEF in 2002, through to 2014, many FCSs remained hopeful for education, access to an amnesty card and package, and for ¢nancial compensation, as discussed above. 8 Several times over the course of the past years, their hopes were shattered, renewed and shattered again. Hope was renewed was when they were sent to school in 2007, and again in May 2010, when the Amnesty Commission held a hearing on their request to register. However, the outcome of this exercise still remains unclear in 2014. This process of hope being raised and shattered again and again has caused a sense of indeterminacy -355 and helplessness in our informants. While in their social lives, they have 'moved on', (i.e. got married and became parents), this social progress is not re£ected in how they feel about themselves. They consistently expressed feelings of being stuck and abandoned:
'It is like I am still in there in the bush.While others went to school or developed a business over the past years, I don't know where to start. I have nothing. Life is taking me in the wrong way. ' (FCS, 31-10-2011) 'In February 2010 we met with the Amnesty Commission, up to now there has not been any response. It has left us suffocating.Where to go and what to do is a problem.' (FCS 28-10-2011) 'Sometimes I reflect about what happened in the bush and when we were abandoned here but there is no way [out] . We would have taken a step but we have no power. ' (FCS, 31-10-2011) What is clearly expressed is an awareness of, in sociological terms, a lack of agency; they feel incapacitated to act and are painfully aware of the resulting stagnation. Similarly, in psychological terms we can read a loss of hope and a perceived lack of control. Their repetitive exposure to unpredictable outcomes has led to a sense of learned helplessness: 'the learned expectation of having no capacity to control the environment, leading to a generalized passivity response' (Reis, 2011 , p177 referring to Lask, 2004 9 . Some caution must be taken, however, in labelling the FCSs response as passive. On the one hand, the FCSs have learned that they could not change their situation through prolonged interactions with unpredictable institutional actors over whom they had no control, and found themselves continuously on the losing side of unful¢lled reintegration and compensation promises. On the other, they feel they have been intentionally made powerless and left empty handed, and therefore, this sense of helplessness engenders frustration and anger. It does not, however, lead to complete passivity, resignation or defeat as the model of learned helplessness would have it (Reis, 2011) . In the following citation Salim clearly exempli¢es the mix of feelings that emerged from our analysis:
'Last year our photos were snapped by the Amnesty Commission, later we found different faces. How? We have nowhere to follow up.This is the anger we have most, because we don't have any direction to follow. No office in the district can be found to direct us' . First author: 'why is that?'Salim: 'They [people at the district] collaborate with our [former] officers, that is why we are left. . . there is too much corruption' . (FCS,19-11-2011) Our ¢ndings suggest it is precisely this combination of dependent waiting (a constant renewal and shattering of hope by outsiders) and feeling anger (towards the attributed cause) that cause an enduring, unsettled state among the FCSs in our study.
Ambiguously relating to an externally imposed identity category: becoming and remaining 'former child soldiers' The moment the adolescents were taken from the rebel camp, they became 'former child soldiers' . Their encounter with this external and universal label, used predominantly in the circles of international development, trauma specialists and peacebuilding has had far reaching consequences for their perception of self. The label identi¢es them mostly as helpless victims (cf. Akello et al., 2006; Branch, 2011) and refers to the notion of having been wronged, bereft of their childhood and concomitant opportunities. Even in the more remote places in the world, the label of former child soldier raises more or less universal expectations of assistance, yet these are expectations that remain hard to live Both and Reis up to in various localities (cf. Shepler, 2014; Angucia, 2010) . Over the past 10 years, our informants have gradually come to understand the care that the international community attaches to this label, and internalise it, yet at the same time experiencing an inability to access this care. Coming from Yumbe, they compare themselves with FCSs in other parts of Uganda (National Resistance Army (NRA) bush war child soldiers and Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) child soldiers), who they believe have received a lot of assistance, especially with regard to education. 10 Based on such assessments, the FCSs in Yumbe feel particularly marginalised. The label FCSs has become a painful identity marker, reminding them foremost of a feeling of neglect:
'The peace is just bad to us, those who were not compensated. It means the peace was not part of us.Why would we be called UNRFII child soldiers? It was a way of damaging us' . (FCS 16-09-2011) In this fragment, we see that our informant feels hurt with regards to the label attached to him during the peace negotiations, because it has become meaningless. Ironically, despite this 'hurt', many youths hold on to this label because elsewhere it has earned ' compensation' . 11 That these youths are not inclined to let go of the FCSs label, ten years down the road, can also be attributed to the aforementioned general ' environment of rewards' in Yumbe. Our interlocutors identi¢cation with an identity as an ex-combatant, implied in the label 'UNRF II (former) child soldier', needs to be preserved into the future if they want to remain entitled to any form of belated government compensation. 12 Therefore, contrary to what Boothby et al. (2006, p97) describe for Mozambique, in Yumbe, there is no ' successful transformation of self-image from being a ' child soldier' to becoming 'like everyone else' . Additionally, the former rebel leaders and Ugandan government play a role in preserving this ambiguous, but prominent, part of the identity of the youths in this study through ongoing delaying ful¢lment of their promises.
Navigating between anger and avoidance in the aftermath of con£ict Considering the poor and unpromising conditions of life after returning from the bush and the feelings of neglect and abandonment, it is not strange that some of the former child-soldiers mention ' going back to the bush' as an option they consider. Feeling powerless in the face of corruption and unable to access their rights under the Amnesty Act, ten years after coming home, aggravates the grievances: '. . .life has become hard, so I now think it was better in the bush, as much as we did not have money, at least food was free. . ... [. . .] if it is possible again to join the bush, I will do it, not to fight against the government, but against the former leadership of the UNRF II, because they are not taking care of us' . (FCS, 16-09-2011) Going back to the bush was sometimes mentioned as a form of desperate revenge for unjust treatment in the aftermath of the peace agreement. Such statements were occasionally meant to be provocative, and are a well known threat in post con£ict areas by dissatis¢ed ex-combatants (cf. Branch, 2011; Finnstrom, 2006; Mergelsberg, 2010) . More often, however, it seemed to be an expression of deep grievances. Other informants were explicit about the fact that it was the desperate situation of their families at home, the hunger 13 and poverty faced, that would motivate them to rejoin a rebel group if such an opportunity would occur. These motivations should be understood from a cultural perspective, where men in Yumbe are traditionally supposed to be providers for their families Unfulfilled promises, unsettled -355 and attitudes of a military type of fearlessness and bravery are in£uential orientations. Joining a rebel group was seen as an act of living up to the notion of fearlessness, while at the same time escaping the confrontation with their sometimes dramatic failure to provide for the family at home. Furthermore, in Yumbe, joining a rebel group is associated, through historical example, with 'remuneration' and thus could be imagined as solution to economic despair and the problem of ' providing' for their wives and children. The remuneration referred to here, can be: the ability to loot food or live from wild animals and fruits in the bush, 'living for free'; the ¢nan-cial support of rebel groups by foreign governments, 14 or the compensation expected from the Ugandan government in case rebels engage in peace negotiations. However, it is important to note that references about ' going back to the bush' are not shared by all FCSs. Three informants, for example, referred to the counselling by TPO Uganda as having helped them not to feel vengeful. 15 Rather, they, emphasised peaceful ways of con£ict resolution or 'forgetting' . Other informants mentioned di¡erent reasons for not believing in violent solutions:
'Despite being unhappy with the neglect by the government, and although I feel uncomfortable, I cannot make any mistake'. (FCS, 16-09-2010) 'When they are looking for people like us now, I cannot join, because they (the UNRF II rebels) have already deceived us'. (FCS, 19-11-2011) Thus, many informants also have their own reasons not to join any armed opposition. At the same time, their disappointment and distrust in the various institutions remains profound. Quite a few youths in Yumbe address their grievances by using khat (a mild stimulant) to suppress a feeling of frustration and achieve a peaceful state of mind. Others, during the course of research, moved away from Yumbe arguing that being away from the government o⁄-cials, ex-rebel leaders and the process of expectant waiting helps them to avoid feelings of revenge and aggression. These examples point to the fact that many of our informants have found avoidance strategies to deal with their anger and frustration.
Discussion
In this article, the authors aimed to provide in-depth insight in the long term impact of having been a child soldier in Yumbe District. This research was undertaken because initial interaction with some of the informants pointed towards ongoing stress factors in the aftermath of armed con£ict that compromised these young people's wellbeing up to ten years after a peace agreement was expected to have brought stability to the region. Our ¢ndings portray how a sense of helplessness and anger seem to be the outcomes of a cumulative experience, with hopes being shattered and renewed over the stretch of more than 10 years, by a variety of actors. While feelings of disappointment and deception among former child soldiers after cease¢res or peace treaties are not uncommon (cf. Ho¡man, 2003; Utas, 2005; Song & de Jong, 2013) , it has not often been acknowledged that NGO's sometimes also play a role in the experience of deception (Branch, 2011) , nor has such a cumulative process of deception over time been extensively described and analysed for its impact. We have shown that, in combination with the ' environment of rewards' in Yumbe for excombatants, and the failure of educational opportunities that could foster reintegration (cf. Betancourt et al., 2008) , FCSs in Yumbe display an inability to see themselves as 'normal' youths ten years after demobilisation. Rather, they keep falling back on an identity as FCSs, still expecting Both and Reis this label to entitle them to support after more than ten years of peace. Yet, falling back on this label, constantly makes them aware of the neglect they feel. We believe it is these enduring and ambiguous cycles that create and perpetuate their feelings of helplessness and anger. Some informants refer to not seeing a way out other than revenge and/or going 'back to the bush' as a (locally meaningful) solution, and some speak explicitly of feelings of revenge. Such feelings among FCSs have been earlier associated with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) by Bayer et al. (2007) , but here the picture is more complicated and political, and cannot be attributed to PTSD alone. A labelling of their anger as a mental health problems resulting from their experiences in the bush could lead to a medicalisation and de-politicisation of their socio-political problems (cf, Branch, 2011) . Our ¢ndings con¢rm then, that identifying local post con£ict sources of distress can make an important contribution to our understanding of the long term outcomes of having been a child soldier, within a particular (historical) context, and our case draws attention to what can perhaps best be labelled as ' political post con£ict stressors' . In line with the orientations by Miller & Rasmussen (2010) and Fernando et al. (2010) , these refer to speci¢c political dynamics that may have a negative impact on FCSs wellbeing in the aftermath of con£ict. However, we should be cautious with just adding new labels to mental health models; there is a risk that this obscures a collective political problem into an individual and medical problem.While young people appear resourceful in managing political stressors, and they develop ways of dealing with their grievances other than responding in violent modes, it seems that the prolonged state of hope and disappointment prevents ' closure', which raises questions about what the future looks like for these youths, and their social environments.
Conclusion
Intervening in the ¢eld of former child soldiers is likely to have 'unexpected e¡ects' (Shepler, 2014) . By applying only a selective approach to individual mental wellbeing in the aftermath of con£ict, complex interactions in the daily lives of FCSs that are shown to be important stress factors become invisible or distorted, and de-politicised. In reality, interventions engage with highly complex local realities and become part of new realities that in£uence the daily lives of their recipients of aid. Di¡e-rent institutions should, therefore, be more concerned about accountability with regards to the promises they make to so called 'vulnerable' groups. This also includes better collaboration and follow-up when institutions work together, or hand over projects to partners. A non-timely handling of grievances that emerge, in relation to promises made but not kept, seems to lead to potentially volatile situations and new forms of psychological harm. E¡orts towards ' closure' and reconciliation, between all parties a¡ected, is recommended.
Limitations
This research builds strongly on extended participant observation and semi structured interviews with a small group of FCSs that were once part of the UNRF II. While we found references suggesting that their experiences re£ect those of a larger dispersed group, more research is needed for con¢rmation. 1 Two FCSs reported that when they were abducted from school, ' some girls were also taken' . These two informants were abducted in 1995 and 1997, respectively. It seems possible that both these informants were abducted by what was then still WNBF, as one of them suggested, while for UNRF II the FCSs mentioned that girls and women were not abducted and that there were no girls nor women in the barracks in South Sudan with them. The o⁄cial number of returnee child soldiers from the UNRF II (135) also consisted of boys only. Community members con¢rmed that girls had not been recruited into the UNRF II. Women and girls, however, did bear the brunt of rape during the long stretch of rebellions (¢eld notes JB). Aware of the danger of ignoring the gender dimension of war, there seems to be consensus among community members in Yumbe that girls and women were not targeted for recruitment nor abduction by the UNRF II. 2 In 2006, a large skills and vocational training by PRAFORD was established under UNIDO, a program meant to train around 3000 people, yet none of the interviewees were able to access this programme. Even though the programme explicitly aimed to target veterans and ex-combatants and their relatives, it is not clear why the former UNRF II child soldiers were not selected for any of the trainings. Possibly this was related to the The FCSs, as mentioned earlier, probably hardly fought in Uganda which allowed for the fact that most of the FCSs reported to be 'received well' when they came home from the bush. Only three of our 26 informants reported a more di⁄-cult reception due to accusations of being involved in atrocities inYumbe.Two informants out of these three therefore felt they needed access to the amnesty card. The remainder of our informants explained they needed amnesty card for material compensation and stated they were not worried about prosecution. 6 As suggested, ex-combatants nationwide have come to rely strongly on this perception of entitlement, a development nourished by the Ugandan Government under former rebel leader president Museveni. It is widely accepted that such a payment might take ages, but precedents have fostered hope that eventually, they will be 'recognised' and paid. 7 One potential informant had mental problems and it was too di⁄cult to converse with him. His friends attributed his condition to marijuana use. Another potential informant refused to participate in the interview after explaining what the interview was about. All informants were told that the survey was part of a larger research that focused on youths inYumbe District and that ¢rst author was a student from the University of Amsterdam and not working with an NGO. 8 This narrative about the unfolding of events was con¢rmed by certain parents and (former) NGO workers. Political sensitivity prevented further inquiry by the authors at other levels. 9 For an elaboration on Seligman's development of learned helplessness theory, see Nunn & Thompson,1996. 10 'Voice of the Former Child Soldiers of the Defunct UNRF II' . 11 See endnote 7. 12 It is important to note here that ex-combatants inYumbe tend to preserve a heroic image of themselves (cf. Bogner & Neubert, 2013) , which makes it plausible that to use the FCS label is not considered stigmatising as other studies report (cf. Akello , 2006) . 13 References were often made to the painful experience of ' seeing your children cry of hunger' . 14 For example Omar al Bashir, president of Sudan supported the UNRF II with arms and money to ¢ght the SPLA. 15 While the author was introduced to Yumbe initially through the help of TPO Uganda, the research participants, by the time of the semi structured interviews were not aware of that and referred to TPO occasionally themselves, they were not asked explicitly about the impact of the TPO training they had received. 
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